An Introduction to Realism
The theory of Realism is arguably the simplest and most compelling of any, with mounds of historical evidence to back it up. Realism is typically defined by its “competitive and conflictual” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2010) nature, asserting the idea that states interact together on the world stage through their own self-interests only. Classical Realism puts this down to human nature and factors present in humanity overall, asserting that it is in one’s nature to look after one’s own first and that we are all inherently self-interested. Structural Realism would argue that it is the very international system which encourages states to pursue power. Large and powerful states, realists would argue, naturally take advantage of smaller or weaker ones and the weak strive to be powerful to escape this cycle.
Realism is typically opposed to Liberalism, which argues a far more optimistic view of the international system and makes the case that the international system encourages cooperation between states, with efforts to minimise conflict.
The Case for Classical Realism
Classical Realism indeed makes an incredibly strong case. As Thomas Hobbes remarks, competition is inherent in humanity as “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies” (Hobbes 2009). Hobbes’ philosophy can clearly be seen in the international system in both modern and historical examples. One example that comes to mind is the conflict between Augustus (Octavian) Caesar and Mark Antony. Octavian and Antony is tale of two friends made enemies by the prospect of unlimited power, by the possibility of ruling Rome, and so warred against one another over this desire that only one could enjoy (History.com 2019).
Another of Hobbes’ observations on human nature, that “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others” (Hobbes 2009), is shown by this same duo. Augustus was known as a sickly scholarly man whereas Antony was a soldier and military man, yet Augustus was able to out-manoeuvre and crush Antony and his family with his superior smarts, which gifted him his military strength. It can also be applied on the world stage, taking Britain for one example. Britain is but a small island yet through the machinations of its trade connections and military force, conquered more sizable nations and formed a substantial empire (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2021).
Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’ is also seen as one of the key texts of Classical Realism, providing to us Niccolò Machiavelli’s own personal rules for being a perfect ruler. The core tenant of this philosophy comes in the form of the rule “it is much safer to be feared than loved” (Harrison 2011). To rule with an iron fist is better than to be a weak ruler beloved by the people, as love is fickle, and fear is permanent so long as one keeps strength. To classical realists, this is inherent to human nature, that if we believe we can rebel against those in charge we always shall. It is shown constantly in the international system, with strong states imposing their will on the weak to inflict fear. Russia can be seen trying to retain its position on the world stage through fear, making threats in the form of a military show of strength, amassing troops at the Ukrainian border (Eleanor Watson 2021). Putin here makes an obviously Machiavellian bid to assert Russia’s dominance of the region.
In history, the Melian Dialogue shows another example of Machiavelli’s philosophy coming into play through Athens complete willingness to be feared. In their eyes “your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness” (Thucydides 2010). They cannot allow states such as Melos to become neutral as it will be seen as a mercy, and other states may try to similarly defy Athens and know that Athens will merely ask them to return to neutrality. If there is no consequence to defying a state, then it shall be defied. This is what both Machiavelli and realists argue, and it can be clearly seen time and time again on the international stage.
The Case for Neorealism
With Neorealism comes a new explanation as to why states desire power. It is not, neorealists would argue, inherent in human nature to be power hungry and self-helping, but instead a cause of the international system itself. The international system is built in such a way where weak states are often subjected to the whims of the more powerful states, and so the way to make life better for your state is to increase your international power. This prompts states into acts of war, defence and ultimately to act in ways which align with the realist viewpoint (Patel 2020).
Defensive Neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz, see that states seek power for security. They would argue that the only way for a state to defend itself truly in the international system is to become more powerful. A powerful state poses the ability to defend itself from attackers and so can exist knowing that it is safe (Duncan Bell 2021). However, the hypocrisy in this is that a state cannot become powerful (or indeed remain powerful) without engaging in realist acts of aggression towards other states. The Melian Dialogue, of course, shows us that to allow mercy towards smaller states acting against a more powerful one would be interpreted as an act of weakness and would destabilise the security of the larger state (Thucydides 2010). One could see China’s disputes with Taiwan to be an example of this in action within the international system today. Whilst an outright war has yet to occur, China considers Taiwan its territory and considers the idea of independent Taiwan to be rebellion. Thus, China could be seen to be acting defensively in its actions towards Taiwan which, although not outrightly militaristic, have included intimidating through the flying of war planes and suppression of Taiwanese voices (Jett 2021). This would follow a realist model of defending one’s territory, showing no weakness so as not to be perceived as such on the international stage.
Defensive Realism also makes the argument that the best international system would be a bipolar one, as “who threatens whom… accelerate(s) as the number of states increases (Kenneth Waltz 2018)”. In Waltz’s view, this would prevent a security dilemma in which the increasing power of other states prompts states to up their own power, resulting in a constant global scaling up. Instead, supposedly, there would only be two superpowers who could threaten one another truly, creating a balance of powers (Pashakhanlou 2018).
However, just as there are defensive realists, there are offensive realists. Headlined by John Mearsheimer, offensive realism falls into line with a lot of Waltz’s beliefs such as that a bipolar system is ideal, and the core neorealist belief that the international system forces states to seek power. However, where offensive realism differs is that as the name suggests, it believes that states are forced to maximise their offensive power to be secure and prevent rivals from doing the same. In addition, where defensive realism posits an end to the maximisation of power if a state can be secure, offensive realism is more swayed by the idea that a state will never stop trying to increase its own power (Dominic D.P. Johnson 2016).
In fact, the only way that a state can be truly secure would be to become the hegemon, knowing for certain that no other states could possibly threaten it. In the same way that some of China’s own territorial disputes can be examined from under the defensive realist lens, Mearsheimer believes China’s rise to power to explicable under the offensive realist system. He believes that China is aware that their economic uprising may be taken as a threat from the United States or other powers, and so must maximise their militaristic capabilities to compensate for this. This, of course, prompts the United States to view them only more so as a threat and so both states are locked into a battle to maximise their own offensive capabilities (Steinsson 2014). Thus, we can see the rise of China to be in line with the offensive realist theory.
Where does Realism go wrong?
As we have assessed so far, there are a great many compelling variants of realism, and the overall philosophy seems to hold. It is fairly undeniable that states seek to improve their position on the world stage and this is done by increasing their own power. Whether or not owing to the human desire for power and self-help, or because the international system forces this kind of interaction is a matter for debate, but the core tenants of realism seem to ring true.
However, Realism is absolutely an imperfect theory that began as a way to make sense of the international system post World War 2. The end of The Cold War and the peaceful decline of the Soviet Union, as well world developments afterwards may work against realists in some ways. The failure to predict the end of The Cold War is endemic of another potential issue for realists, which is the inability to take into account non-state actors. Individuals and corporations have since become major players on the world stage, with billionaires able to fund political parties that would change how a state may act in the world stage. Corporations can now also act as major players on the world stage with potential strangleholds over states and in the famous case of Pepsi, their own military force (Limos 2020).
Whilst realism’s reliance on history and how things have always been may have blindsided it to the idea of a developing world with new actors, realists have developed ways to counter this. In some respects, realists can very easily rationalise that non-state actors don’t often change the motivations of the state. They may sway certain policies, but it is rare that a corporation or billionaire could stop a state from seeking self-help and ultimately power from within the international system. That being said, realists offer little in the case of internal conflicts or terrorist groups. These actors could turn a state’s motivations away from the accumulation of power into merely stability on the world stage for a period of time, as they would not be reacting to other states because in this moment, they do not present the greatest threat at this time (Laksmana 2013). They even give up certain amounts of leverage on the world stage by allowing another nation to aid them in their internal conflict, losing some sovereignty or defensive capabilities.
Another easy critique of realism is that simply put, the world seems to be moving more and more towards international cooperation. The introduction of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) can absolutely be seen as nations ceding some power for the sake of security, which directly counters realist theory. The United Nations, for example, holds misbehaving nations to account for their actions and tries to find ways to maintain peace between nations, which doesn’t allow for strong nations to exert their individual power over small nations as they have been able to throughout all of time. This isn’t to say that IGOs are all encompassing and prevent any realist conflict from taking place, but more that the international system seems to be leaning towards cooperation rather than conflict.
However, a realist might make several arguments here. For one, they could make the argument that whilst the world may now be experiencing a period of cooperation, that this is temporary. Cooperation may, at the moment, be prevailing but a realist would argue that this changes nothing about how the international system requires states to gather power. They could also make the convincing argument that IGOs are not exempt from realism and that the large nations still dominate these IGOs openly (Inayatullah 2009), using it as another method to exert their will over smaller nations through vetoes, exclusive options and filling the body with members sympathetic to them. China is guilty of this, using their power to escape human rights criticisms (Tung Cheng-Chia 2020)
In Conclusion
Its hard to deny, overall, that realism gets much wrong. As a result of being rooted in a time lacking international accountability, where large states could openly invade and dominate the international system, realism’s biggest weakness is that it fails to look forward and contemplate change. It failed to predict that individuals and corporations would become so important in the international system and falters somewhat when dealing with internal conflict. They could, however, merely see this as an extension of realism, an evolution of the same international system under the guise of cooperation.
Those aside, realism has been extraordinarily adept at analysing the international system with the variants all having their own strengths and weaknesses. States are run by humans and Thomas Hobbes’ works have been intrinsic in providing an analysis that humans yearn for power and self-help, explaining why states do the same. The Melian Dialogue and Machiavelli’s philosophy too provide evidence to states acting as vessels for human nature to interact in the world stage. Neorealists promote an equally compelling view that it is intrinsic to the international system itself rather than human nature that makes states seek power. Defensive realists and offensive realists both offer their own views of why states seek power, but overall realism is a theory through which a great deal of action on the international stage makes a lot of sense. Thus, it is clear that realism does get the big things right, and whilst it may get a few smaller things slightly wrong, it has the ability to rationalise these things within adapted versions of realism.
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